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ABSTRACT
The present article is devoted to a discussion of the crisis of 
humanism and prospects for a post-anthropocentric society. The 
evolution of humanism is traced as a broad cultural phenomenon that 
affects all spheres of society. The author sets out to show that the 
crisis of humanism is associated not only with philosophical criticism 
from the perspectives of trans- and post-humanism, but also with the 
prospects for a society in which humanistic ideas about a person as 
a bodily- and mentally-autonomous being continue to predominate. 
In this regard, various ethical and philosophical concepts are 
considered that seemingly point to the inevitability of going beyond 
the limits of anthropocentrism. However, one particular problem that 
emerges is either ignored by many authors or remains to be properly 
resolved. This problem is associated with the prospect of losing the 
capability of “metamorphosis” due to the latest human technologies 
for universal communication (empathy and understanding) along with 
the destruction of the fragile global “lifeworld”. The destruction of this 
lifeworld is fraught with alienation and the multiplication of planetary 
risks. The author proposes that the problem of unpredictability and 
the danger of manmade interventions in human nature can best be 
approached by considering the hypothetical posthuman in close 
relationship with the social whole. This philosophical “optics” can be 
borrowed from the philosophy of personalism, understood here as 
the set of philosophical attitudes that affirm the highest value of a 
personality as a transcending being, involved in a timeless dialogue 
with other personalities. 
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Introduction
In this article, I address the theme of the crisis of humanism. Although this topic has 
been relevant since Nietzsche, today the prospect of a posthuman society (in the broad 
sense) is becoming quite real. Humanism has suffered a double blow: on the one hand, 
as anthropocentrism comes under increasing criticism; on the other hand, as a set of 
value attitudes that emphasise the unique and exceptional nature of man, which may 
be radically transformed in the not-too-distant future. In this context, corresponding 
ethical discourses arise, which state both the inevitability and the desirability of the 
post-anthropocentric era. Nevertheless, in what follows, I aim to show that discussions 
about a post-anthropocentric future are far from being concluded. Rather, in stating 
the problem, the unsatisfactory nature of the available solutions only becomes more 
glaringly apparent. This problem involves the imminent destruction of the fragile 
planetary “lifeworld” (or intersubjective space) as a result of chaotic “improvements” 
carried out by people to their bodies and consciousness. As I will try to show, the 
destruction of this intersubjective space is fraught with alienation and the multiplication 
of global risks. Thus, in order to address the problem of increasing unpredictability and 
mitigate the danger of manmade interventions in human nature, it will be necessary to 
consider the hypothetical posthuman in close interrelation with the social whole. The 
necessary “optics” for such an approach is provided by the philosophy of personalism, 
which can be understood in a broad sense as giving the central role to personality, 
considered as a transcending being in timeless dialogue with other personalities. The 
main thesis of the article is that, unlike other “post-anthropocentric” philosophical 
concepts, the personalistic way of understanding reality is more “sensitive” to the 
issues of maintaining unity, integrity – and, accordingly, the vitality of society.
Humanism: From “Dawn” to “Dusk”?
To begin with, due to ambiguities inherent in the term “humanism” stemming from 
its use in a variety of contexts, it will be necessary to try to create some conceptual 
clarity. In a broad sense, humanism can be used to describe any orientation towards 
human beings in terms of their happiness, material or spiritual well-being, etc. Thus, 
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for example, one can sometimes find such usages as “Christian humanism”. In 
what follows, however, the term “humanism” is understood in its narrowest sense 
as comprising the set of common ideological attitudes within which a human being 
is considered as a free, unique, autonomous and terrestrial – or “earthly”– creature. 
Humanism, therefore, proceeds: (1) from the immanence of human existence, the 
humanity of man; (2) from the fact that the ultimate source of higher values, forming 
a kind of “ethical measuring stick” is man himself, his “interests”; (3) consequently, 
the consideration of everything else only through the conceptual prism of a person 
understood only in this way (i.e. anthropocentrism). Here I would like to once again 
emphasise that, in what follows, humanism is not considered as an ideology in its own 
right and should therefore not be exclusively associated with e.g. liberalism, since 
it can also be present in varying philosophical or ideological trends (for example, in 
sometimes absurd and contradictory combinations in the ideologies of national 
socialism or communism). Subsequently, we will not additionally distinguish between 
the various varieties of humanism (e.g. Renaissance, Enlightenment, modern secular 
humanism, etc.). It is undoubtedly worth pausing to consider the very significant 
differences between the different varieties of humanism, since these involve the 
most diverse understandings of man in terms of his nature and essence. At the 
same time, we will note not so much the specifics as those elements of continuity 
that allow us to draw conclusions about humanism (and its crisis) as a kind of integral 
cultural phenomenon or at least an interconnected set of those traits in philosophical 
thought and everyday thinking that originated in the Renaissance era and which, 
albeit gradually changing, have survived to this day. 
In order to show that “humanistic civilisation” has entered its sunset period, it will 
be first necessary to clarify what are the constituent elements forming the backbone 
of humanism itself. Here it will be necessary to take cognisance of the inseparability 
of humanism from those processes that gradually led to the formation of bourgeois 
society (some historians attribute these changes to the so-called Commercial 
Revolution, which took place from around the end of the 13th to the 18th century1). The 
rise of bourgeois society was accompanied by a disenchantment (Weber, 1905–
1910/2002) of the world. As Solomon Stam notes, the advent of humanism (here we 
are talking about its earliest form during the Renaissance) became possible because 
at first in the most developed cities of Italy of the 14th–15th centuries, and then in 
other Western European countries, a capitalist system arose, an early bourgeoisie, 
adversarial dominant feudalism and its powerful servant – the church (see: Stam, 
1984, p. 4). Humanism would not have been possible without first creating a basis for 
the direct growth of material well-being, providing giving hope for a joyful life together, 
for incremental progress – in short, the possibility of realising Heaven on Earth. Stam 
continues that after a millennium that saw the domination of Christian-ascetic ideology 
proceeding from the dogma of “original sin”, it was as if comprising an inevitable 
gravitational force over people, concerning the depravity and insignificance of a 
1 This was facilitated by the rapid growth of cities, the emergence of banks, joint-stock companies, 
the growth of money circulation, the gradual technological progress in navigation, cartography, the discovery 
of America, etc. (see Spufford, 1989).
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person (Innocent III equated a person with a worm, even placing him lower than the 
worm); and it should have been, first of all, moral to rehabilitate a person, justify his high 
dignity, his limitless possibilities for improvement and creativity, to which Giannozzo 
Manetti would refer as “the greatest and immeasurable glory of our humanity” (see: 
Stam, 1984, p. 6).
Accordingly, in justifying the desire for “earthly” well-being, humanism as 
“immanent” anthropocentrism rehabilitates what was earlier considered in terms 
of vice: ambition, the desire to receive earthly pleasures (including “earthly” love) – 
even, in some cases, greed. The sacralisation of earthly man along with his own 
earthly aspirations (not transcendental essences) was expressed in the praise of 
all the “earthly” ones, from the ubiquitous eroticism and satire of the Decameron 
(Boccaccio, 1353/2003), the erotic love stories of the Heptameron (Marguerite of 
Navarre, 1558/1984), Bracciolini’s earthy scatological humour (Bracciolini, 1470/1984), 
the vulgar jokes and relentless satire of Gargantua and Pantagruel (Rabelais, 1532–
1564/2016), Erasmus’ Praise of Folly to the thoroughgoing (not to say humorous) 
disparagement of all Christianity of Bonaventure Des Périers’ (Des Périers, 1537/1965) 
in Cymbalum Mundi. In his Utopia, Thomas More depicts a hedonist society for whom 
the highest happiness is to have all material wealth in abundance and a “pleasant life”: 
The Utopians therefore regard the enjoyment of life – that is, pleasure – as the 
natural object of all human efforts; and the natural, as they define it, is synonymous 
with virtuous. However, Nature also wants us to help one another to enjoy life, 
for the very good reason that no human being has a monopoly of her affections 
(More, 1516/2003, p. 92).
Moreover, the philosophy of Renaissance humanism is already characterised 
by an internal antinomy associated with the understanding of “liberation” from 
the transcendental. The labours of many early humanists are characterised by 
a duality of evaluations of the “immanent”2. It would seem that this dichotomy 
had already encompassed “in itself” the embryo of the subsequent long (still 
ongoing) philosophical discussion concerning the shortcomings of “immanent” 
anthropocentrism, within which framework the philosophy of posthumanism would 
arise. As noted by R. Chen-Morris, H. Yoran, and G. Zak, 
Optimism and doubt are different sides of the same coin as they are minted from 
the same presupposition of humanist discourse, namely, the undermining of the 
metaphysical mooring of human reality. Humanist discourse rejects – usually 
implicitly – the fundamental assumption of the Western philosophical tradition that 
behind phenomenal reality there is an intelligible and unchangeable substance. 
Instead, humanists often assume that human reality is an artifact that can be 
fashioned by human efforts: hence humanism’s sense of liberation, creative 
2 Even in Petrarch's “contempt for the world”, we see precisely the internal struggle of striving 
for the active affirmation of the ambitious contemporaneous “earthly man” with an ascetic worldview 
(Petrarch, 1343/2011).
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cultural energies, and anthropological optimism; and hence the novel historical, 
ethical, and political theories elaborated by the humanists. But the undermining of 
the traditional metaphysical order of things necessarily threatens basic beliefs and 
convictions and creates a sense of cultural dislocation and psychological anxiety. 
In the intellectual sphere, this shift gave rise to fundamental questions concerning 
the ultimate foundation of ethics and the legitimation of the political order. It is this 
ambiguity that characterises the humanist discourse and establishes it as the 
foundation of modernity itself (Chen-Morris, Yoran, & Zak, 2015, p. 430). 
The further evolution of humanism took place mainly in the direction of an “excision” 
of its former theistic “birthmarks”3. In its mature, completed (“pure”) form, humanism 
is precisely secular (“exclusive”) humanism, characterised by the primacy of reason, 
ethics based on critical thinking – and, of course, the ideal of freedom (Kurtz, 2007).
The Crisis of Humanism: “External” or “Internal”?
The emergence of the critique of humanism may be dated to around the same 
period as criticism of the Christian worldview started to become a feature of the 
philosophical thought of the Modern era. Although the isolated “I” of the modern 
individual subject would give rise to a sense of strength, power, invulnerability to 
spirits, along with pride and dignity, at the time, it was confronted with a disenchanted 
world that was typically experienced as flat and empty (Taylor, 2007, p. 593). All 
of this not infrequently resulted in an urge to overcome the “immanent order” of 
modern reason, to go beyond the present dimension of a disciplined economic or 
reproductive activity. Charles Taylor, for example, views some manifestations of 
romanticism as an attempt to revolutionise the “immanent order”. He writes:
The depth and fullness of ordinary life has been articulated for us in an art which 
constantly seems to transgress the limits of the natural-human domain. The 
Romantic sense of nature, for instance, is hard to separate from images of a larger 
force, or a current of life sweeping through all things. These images, central for 
instance to Wordsworth’s poetry [...] break the carefully erected boundaries of 
the buffered identity, which neatly divide mind from nature (Taylor, 2007, p. 701).
The Romantic search for inspiration and “depth” in the boundless forces of nature 
can be seen as a kind of attempt to break out of the “immanent” order. 
To a certain extent, a “anti-humanistic” attitude was characterised by heroic 
ethics centred around aristocratic military virtues that resisted the humanistic 
affirmation of the highest value of human life (Taylor, 2007, p. 320). In terms of being 
impregnated with references to heroic ethics, Nietzsche’s philosophy can also be 
conditionally referred to as anti-humanistic. Nietzsche’s Superman is a being who, in 
standing over the “ordinary” man and his present being, affirms his self-over-others. 
3 Here we must emphasise the word “old”, inasmuch as we are talking about medieval theology. 
Here it is worth noting that Christianity itself also subsequently absorbed the influence of humanism.
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Nietzsche considers the lives of individuals to be below the values that the Superman 
creates (“creating values is the true right of masters” (Nietzsche, 1886/2017)). Many of 
Nietzsche’s ideas were anticipated by Max Stirner, who contraposed humanistic “faith 
in man” with the egoism of the Unique. Stirner’s interpretations of the overwhelming 
and exclusive “religion of humanism” turned out to be prophetic (we recall, for example, 
the totalitarian USSR, in which masses of people were destroyed in the name of the 
abstract “man” of the communist future). As Stirner writes,
If as in the revolution, “the human being” is understood as the “good citizen”, then 
from this concept of “the human being” come the well-known political offenses 
and crimes. In all this, the individual, the individual human being, is regarded as 
scum, and contrarily, the universal human being, “the human being”, is honoured 
(Stirner, 1845/2017).
Nevertheless, humanism should not be considered solely as a belief in an abstract 
“person” (the so-called “metaphysical” humanism – see Heidegger, 1946/1978). The 
fact that such a faith has appeared and still exists only implies that humanism as 
an “immanent” anthropocentrism has become the source of various corresponding 
ideological trends connected with the construction of abstractions – or, as Stirner would 
say, “spooks”. Like Nietzsche, however, Stirner can also be seen in partially humanistic 
terms. For both thinkers, there is no “higher” reality. There is only the “I” (Superman / The 
Unique), confronted both by a hostile material world and the “others”. Their philosophy 
is imbued with love for man as a terrestrial creature, the only difference being that the 
humanism in question is not misanthropic, but egocentric. One can even say that this 
is the “purest” anthropocentrism, because the human being itself is taken here not as 
some kind of abstract whole, but as directly existing. Therefore, we should not be too 
surprised when Jean-Paul Sartre, in his famous essay “Existentialism is a Humanism”, 
sets forth ideas that have much in common with Stirner’s ideas. Here, true humanism is 
to be found in the freedom of choice of an “abandoned” person. Sartre writes:
This is humanism because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; 
that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also, because we show 
that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, 
an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can 
realise himself as truly human (Sartre, 1956/1989).
Nevertheless, humanism gradually “accumulated” contradictions. In the first place, 
the internal contradiction of humanism inherited from the Renaissance, consisting in 
an ambiguous combination of the “costs” and “benefits” of rejecting the transcendental, 
never disappeared. Therefore, strictly speaking, humanism has never been able to 
achieve absolute dominance or completely push out the transcendent from social life – 
which today, although in a somewhat individualised form, has maintained its position 
in the search for religious meaning (Taylor, 2007). Secondly, the “immanent order” of 
modern societies accumulated its own set of contradictions. Belief in reason, freedom 
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and human dignity did not end up saving humanity from destructive wars, exploitation, 
violence and injustice. Serious damage to humanism was inflicted by Sigmund Freud 
with his criticism of man as a rational autonomous being (see, e.g., Freud, 1927/1949). 
In the end, this accumulation of contradictions led to serious philosophical criticism 
of the “predominating” position of humanism. Posthumanism thus emerges as a kind 
of development and deepening of postmodernism (the term “posthumanism” in the 
modern sense appears in 1977 (Hassan, 1977)4. The philosophy of posthumanism is 
gradually being formed and developed in the field of literary criticism (Hayles, 1999), 
as well as in philosophical studies on the deconstruction of “the human”. Today, it 
is widely represented in feminist discourses (Donna Haraway, Rosi Braidotti, Karen 
Barad, Stacy Alaimo, F. Ferrando [Alaimo, 2016; Barad, 2003; Braidotti, 2013; 
Ferrando, 2019; Haraway, 1991] and others).
In general, posthumanism is characterised by a scepticism towards any 
idealisation of human subjectivity. Thus, the idea of the Cartesian subject was first 
deconstructed within the framework of the “linguistic turn”, when it was shown that 
man comprises a location where discourses intersect, something hidden by the 
veil of the unconscious; that the free subject is an illusion, and that, in general, as 
Michel Foucault observes, “man is a recent invention”. Subsequently, however, the 
conceptual focus has shifted somewhat, with proponents of the “new materialisms” 
trying to overcome the dualism of matter and culture that resisted the efforts of 
postmodernists. “The death of the subject” means that, in the material sense, a 
person is not a “centred” monad point in space. Moreover, between matter and 
culture there is an “intra-action” – that is, an instantaneous two-way relationship. 
From this perspective, a person can only be seen as part of a very complex material 
and cultural “context”. In other words, it is not man, but matter itself that turns out to be 
“agential” (agential matter – “agent”, acting matter). As Mónica Cano Abadía explains, 
This critical posthumanism, indebted with French antihumanism, feminist 
anti-universalism and anti-colonialism, tries to disconnect the definition 
of the human of its universalist position. The human within humanism is a 
“systematised standard of recognisability – of Sameness – by which all others 
can be assessed, regulated and allotted to a designated social location” (Cano 
Abadía, 2018, p. 173).
To abandon this regulatory notion of the human means to embrace a more 
complex and a less discriminatory vision of the subject. Thus, a posthuman vision 
of the subject could lead toward more respectful, anti-universalist, materialist 
and post-anthropocentric ways of analysing our world (Ibid.). In essence, the 
posthumanist position entails an abandonment of ethics based on anthropocentrism. 
“Posthumanism”, writes Francesca Ferrando, “can be seen as a post-exclusivism: 
an empirical philosophy of mediation, which offers a reconciliation of existence in 
4 Foucault’s Death of the Subject (Foucault, 1966/1994), Derrida’s grammatology (Derrida, 
1967/1977), the collapse of metanarratives in J.-F. Lyotard (Lyotard, 1979/1984), schizoanalysis by Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972/1977) and many more.
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its broadest significations. Posthumanism does not employ any frontal dualism or 
antithesis, demystifying any ontological polarisation through the postmodern practice 
of deconstruction” (Ferrando, 2013, p. 29).
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that post-humanism, though dangerous, 
is not fatal to humanism. In the end, posthumanist criticism focuses mainly on a 
very specific ideological form of humanism. The direct association with humanism 
of such phenomena as colonialism, racism and male domination by some post-
humanist philosophers5 seems at least dubious. Here we are again talking about 
criticism of the humanistic “spooks” (or rather, constructed ideas about the abstract 
“human”). At the same time, it is possible to doubt the sequence of posthumanistic 
anti-anthropocentrism. In this form, posthumanism continues to take the form of 
the self-reflection of the modern “isolated self”. However, ultimately, this “isolated 
I” cannot offer anything more than a particular recognition of “myself” that emerges 
from the process (assembly/relational entity, etc.) consisting in the general cosmic 
order of things. Thus, although a different “spook” is being constructed, a different 
idea of the abstract “man”, it is already striving for a peaceful life-coexistence within 
the framework of an infinite variety of different forms of subjectivity, as well as 
“reconciliation” with “matter” itself (for example, planet Earth and biological processes 
occurring on it). Here it becomes apparent that we are talking about a new humanistic 
“spook”. However, if previously the criterion of non-human could be applied to one 
who did not meet European norms of rationality/subjectivity, today a non-human 
becomes one who does not agree with the “new” values of tolerance, multiculturalism, 
etc., towards which posthumanism is ostensibly oriented. While this may no longer 
be aggressive anthropocentrism (although it is necessary to consider in relation to 
whom this aggression is considered), from the very fact that a “person” recognises 
his responsibility for aggression or violence against any other and from free choice 
in favour of moving to the “ontological equality” of various forms of being, it is still 
possible to make out the outlines of anthropocentrism. Rather, it consists in an act of 
self-reflection, a kind of “goodwill”, but not a consistent and direct departure from the 
limits of humanism (in fact, in some cases there are no intentions to build any kind of 
neo-humanism (Braidotti, 2019, p. xiii)6. 
5 R. Braidotti: “The human is a normative convention, which does not make it inherently negative, 
just highly regulatory and hence instrumental to practices of exclusion and discrimination. The human norm 
stands for normality, normalcy and normativity. It functions by transposing a specific mode of being human 
into a generalised standard, which acquires transcendent values as the human: from male to masculine 
and onto human as the universalised format of humanity. This standard is posited as categorically and 
qualitatively distinct from the sexualised, racialised, naturalised others and also in opposition to the 
technological artefact. The human is a historical construct that became a social convention about ‘human 
nature’” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 26).
6 Consistent posthumanism would completely deny the anthropocentric view. This would mean, for 
example, the struggle for recognition of the “right” of SARS-Cov-2 and all other bacteria and viruses to equal 
existence as forms of vitality/materiality/agency and so on. It would also imply the denial (“deconstruction”) 
of all elementary “human” categories of thinking (like “tolerance”, the desire for equality, the maintenance of 
life, etc.). To consistently avoid anthropocentrism, posthumanists should author their writings on the “behalf” 
of assemblies/relationalities, avoiding all human “proper names” that imply centring on a particular person. 
However, it turns out to be based on the same anthropocentrism, but with a conscientious (often hypocritical) 
overlay expressing concern for non-human others.
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Far more dangerous to humanism is humanism itself, with the real threat 
consisting not in “external” criticism, but rather in terms of an “internal” transformation 
into something hostile to it. And here it is necessary to look not so much at the various 
ethical positions, not at the sphere of philosophical discussions, but at humanism 
as a cultural fact of social life, as an “immanent” anthropocentrism permeating the 
consciousness of a modern person. This “immanent” anthropocentrism implies the 
consideration of man as one of the “objects” of the material world that can undergo 
a radical transformation. Technological development itself warrants the relatively 
rapid disappearance of the human, i.e. the very species Homo Sapiens. A number of 
philosophers and researchers argue that sooner or later technologies will allow the 
creation of superhumans (immortals with “improved” brains and physical abilities), 
that people will change genes, integrate into the technological environment (i.e. 
become cyborgs) – and that artificial intelligence technologies will develop giving rise 
to superconsciousness or super-beings endowed with such a consciousness (or there 
will be a union of all beings into one super-being, etc.). Here we are talking about the 
philosophy of transhumanism as espoused by Julian Huxley (Huxley, 1958), Robert 
Ettinger (Ettinger, 1972), F. M. Esfandiary (Esfandiary, 1989), Nick Bostrom (Bostrom, 
2016), Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil, 2005), and many others. Transhumanist philosophers 
emphasise the inevitability of overcoming humanity’s limitations by means of 
technology. “Backward” humans will continue to occupy a place either in some kind 
of zoo reservation or on the fringes of the future civilisation, while the initiative passes 
to a new race (or races) of intelligent artificially-derived superhuman humanoids 
(or completely artificial robotic creatures). At the same time as adhering to liberal 
or libertarian beliefs that advocate the freedom of everyone to control their bodies, 
most transhumanist authors somewhat paradoxically assert the futility of attempts to 
prevent the appearance of the transhuman7. 
However, the prospect of a radical technological transformation of human nature 
does not in itself imply a crisis of humanism. After all, as has been repeatedly noted 
by various theorists (see Ferrando, 2019), transhumanist discourses remain primarily 
anthropocentric in their basic orientation. A genuine crisis of humanism is rather 
associated with those dangers that logically arise from the attempts of human beings 
to intervene in their own biological natures. This perspective has spawned a whole 
branch of ethical debate – for example, as seen in polemics between bio-conservatives 
and techno-liberals (see Bailey, 2005; Fukuyama, 2003; Habermas, 2003, etc.). At the 
same time, it should be emphasised that the prospect of a radical transformation of 
human nature is not something that has been “invented” by ideologists or ethics. Rather, 
it is the reality of a society in which the principles of “immanent” anthropocentrism 
come to prevail. In such a society, the introduction of technologies for changing the 
nature of man is indeed inevitable. In a disconnected and alienated world, in which 
there is no single organising and controlling centre (after all, the “highest value” of 
7 As clarified by Y. N. Harari, “This will not happen in a day, or a year. Indeed, it is already happening 
right now, through innumerable mundane actions. Every day millions of people decide to grant their 
smartphone a bit more control over their lives or try a new and more effective antidepressant drug. In pursuit 
of health, happiness and power, humans will gradually change first one of their features and then another, and 
another, until they will no longer be human” (Harari, 2017, p. 60).
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bourgeois society continues to be a certain “isolated” entity, considered in terms of 
its essential separateness), it is impossible to completely ban certain experiments 
aimed at the transformation of the human body and consciousness. Even if such bans 
were to be applied in some countries, there would still continue to be numerous “dead 
zones” that do not fall under the purview of ethical regulation. 
What dangers are we talking about here? In most cases, we are talking about 
potentially unpredictable health risks for those whose bodies will be “improved”, 
be it genetic engineering (using CRISPR genome editing mechanisms, etc.) or 
cyborgisation (implantation of mind-changing chips in the brain, etc.). There are also 
risks associated with the insecurity of human nature transformation technologies 
themselves (for example, scenarios of uncontrolled self-replication of nanorobots – 
the so-called “grey goo”). Finally, we can mention potential “social” risks: e.g. unequal 
access to human improvement technologies, which may result in a further increase in 
social inequality.
Nevertheless, I consider that these are not the principal problems associated 
with technologies for changing the nature of a human being. Much more serious, yet 
rarely-considered despite being the potential source of an infinite number of additional 
misfortunes, is the very real prospect of the destruction of human “lifeworld” as a 
result of an infinite number of “modifications” that make the achievement of global 
unity unrealistic: the destruction of the “organic” basis for an empathic commonality 
of experience due to prevailing practices that radically alter the body and mind. 
Such a destruction of the “community of experience” is fraught with alienation, the 
disintegration of humanity into “(post-)humanity” lacking mutual comprehension 
and the total chaos of untrammelled technological progress. All this can lead to the 
destruction of the ability to reach consensus, which is fraught with the most adverse 
consequences imaginable. Therefore, what is important concerns not so much how 
we look at various technologies today, but whether we will be able to enter into any 
constructive dialogue about them in the future?
We shall not assert that this problem has been completely ignored in modern 
discourses concerning technologies for changing the nature of man. However, the 
available responses are not altogether convincing. In briefly considering them, we will 
also try to outline one of the possible approaches to solving this problem, which can 
be formulated based on the philosophical optics of personalism. 
The End of Dialogue?
From a personalistic perspective, the main problem facing “changing” humanity 
today can be seen to consist in the “disappearance” of dialogue (as a moment of 
intersubjective unity). There is no philosophical consensus about what constitutes the 
essence of a person: despite many scientific and technological advances, we still do 
not know what a human being is. However, it is difficult to argue with the proposition 
that all representatives of the species Homo Sapiens have something in common. No 
matter how cultures, languages, social idealities, etc. may vary, there is something 
that allows all people to at least partially understand the experience of other people, 
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even those who lived in previous times. Nearly everyone is able to admire the 
heroic exploits of the characters of the Iliad or appreciate the rousing signification of 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. Although this experience can be perceived by us in a 
“distorted” sense, i.e. not in the same way it would be perceived by our contemporaries, 
nevertheless, it still will not be something completely alien for us or inaccessible 
to our understanding. At the genetic level, changes taking place in a human being 
over thousands of years have been insignificant; therefore, a certain set of common 
biological processes preserved in the human body and brain still determine repetitive 
patterns of behaviour conferring the capability of empathic experience (for example, 
the activity of mirror neurons).
Needless to say, today we live in a world of alienation, full of injustice, cruelty 
and indifference. Nevertheless, remaining common “species” traits inspire the hope 
that someday it will be possible to arrive at a more solidary state (the hope for a post-
capitalist society, in which the alienating principle of the pursuit of profit is replaced by 
the principle of solidarity on a global scale is still very much alive (see, e.g., Mason, 
2017; Srnicek & Williams, 2015, etc.)). The main obstacle to this is, as already noted, 
that technologies used to change human nature can destroy that generality, which 
supports – however tenuous and barely noticeable – a unity between people (what 
can be referred to as a “universal human identity”). How do the proponents of various 
ethical and philosophical movements respond to this challenge? 
As we have already seen, the crisis of humanism is experienced not so much 
in ideological terms as at a social level. Therefore, it becomes necessary to focus 
not on the ideological component of humanism per se, but rather at how it affects 
society (or reflects this structure) and what risks connected with further technological 
development can be mitigated or obviated by this social structure. Since humanism 
is “genetically” associated with the bourgeois economy (Gorfunkel, 2017), the modern 
capitalist world-system (see, e.g., Wallerstein, 2004) – along with its inherently 
competitive struggle and individualism – is also largely a product of humanism 
(although, of course, we are talking here about an interdependent relationship, 
expressed in Marxist terms concerning the dialectic of the “basis” and “superstructure”). 
Along with “improvements” connected with increasing individualisation, such social 
conditions are likely to lead to an increasing descent into chaos. Thus, it follows from 
humanism and the forms of transhumanism ensuing from it that people should have 
the freedom to change their own organism. As Gilbert Hottois notes, the vast majority 
of transhumanists are agnostics or atheists, secularists and free-thinkers. The values 
and intentions they proclaim are close to modern secular humanism (see Hottois, 
2014, p. 48). Liberal and libertarian transhumanists assert that, if an “earthly man”, on 
the basis of his own “earthly” moral principles or preferences, receives technological 
capabilities allowing him to cease to be a representative of the species Homo Sapiens, 
then such is his choice, which should only be supported. Moreover, all liberal and 
libertarian transhumanists do is to take this same “earthly man” and unfold the old 
anthropocentric ethics of the “supremacy of a higher being” over the rest of the world 
in a new way. Hence, the main problem, for this is the direct path to a chaotic collapse 
of the processes of transformation of human nature, leading to the destruction of what 
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can be conditionally designated as the “lifeworld”8. As Spanish scholars Armesilla 
Conde and Santiago Javier point out, transhumanism will give rise to a minority 
of creatures for an indefinitely long time, economically and politically influential, 
proud of their way of life, separated from the rest of humanity that experiences less 
improvement, which will be developed only to maintain the appropriation of capitalist 
property, of the capitalist division of labour, of capital as the primary element of 
industrial relationship (see Conde & Javier, 2018, p. 66)9.
Since the individualised and atomised society is already characterised by a mass 
of contradictions, the ultimate diversification of human corporeality will only deepen 
these contradictions, destroying the already fragile organic “props” of universal 
solidarity.
Of course, not all forms of transhumanism are blind to issues connected with 
maintaining the integrity of the social organism. In this connection, so-called 
democratic (social democratic?) transhumanism deserves special attention. For 
example, James Hughes focuses on problems related to the provision of equal access 
to “human improvement” technologies, as well as on issues of reaching consensus 
on the control of technological risks associated with the use of these technologies. 
However, the main thrust of Hughes’s “social” discourse emphasises the exclusive 
right of people to something he refers to as “bodily sovereignty”. Hughes writes: 
We not only need to radicalise our understanding of citizens, the bearers of 
rights, but also of the rights we have to control our bodies and minds, and the 
structures we need to make those freedoms real. The right to control our bodies 
and minds should include the right of sane adults to change and enhance their 
own minds and bodies, to own our own genetic code, to take recreational drugs, 
to control our own deaths, and to have ourselves frozen. Procreative liberty, an 
extension of the right to control our body and life, should include the right to use 
germinal choice technologies to ensure the best possible life for our children. 
Strong democratic government is required not only to protect these rights, but to 
ensure that the technologies are tested for safety so that consumers understand 
their risks and benefits. We also need strong social democracies to ensure all 
citizens have access to these options, not just the affluent (Hughes, 2002; see 
also Hughes, 2004).
8 The understanding of “lifeworld” here is close to that expressed in the work of Jurgen Habermas. 
According to Habermas, “the lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, 
where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), 
and where they can criticise and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at 
agreements. In a sentence: participants cannot assume in actu the same distance in relation to language and 
culture as in relation to the totality of facts, norms, or experiences concerning which mutual understanding is 
possible” (Habermas, 1987, p. 126).
9 Accordingly, “liberal-libertarian” transhumanism turns the old idea of perfecting man inside out, 
reducing him to a purely technological problem. As Nicolas le Dévédec remarks, “in its journey from the 
Enlightenment to transhumanism, the notion of perfectibility has been particularly distorted. Though it refers 
to a political project and an improvement of human beings in and by society in the Enlightenment (proposed 
in particular by Jean-Jacques Rousseau), it is simplified in transhumanist rhetoric to the technoscientific 
adaptation of the human being and of life itself. For transhumanism, politically changing the world is no longer 
the question” (le Dévédec, 2018, p. 3).
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Admittedly, a “democratic” approach may help to mitigate “direct” risks, but it 
will not solve the problem of maintaining a “communicative whole”. Sooner or later, 
“improved” (post-)people will lose their ability to sympathise with everyone else and, as 
a consequence, will cease to share a common human identity (I would label such a 
hypothetical situation with the term “great misunderstanding”).
Here we can assume that the problem consists in the “immanent” order of 
modernity. At the same time, any appeal to the transcendental is likely to lead to 
even greater risks of destruction of the already tenuous layer of the universal human 
“lifeworld”. There have been many recent attempts to include the idea of technological 
“improvement” of a person in various religious discourses (see, e.g., Cole-Turner, 
2008; Donaldson & Cole-Turner, 2018; Maher & Mercer, 2009; Maher & Mercer, 2014, 
and other). In other words, although an appeal to the transcendent can function as a 
source of basic values and life guidelines (for example, God the Father as something 
that binds all that exists into a single whole, etc.), a transcendental a priori cannot 
form the basis of social unity – at least, not on a global scale. However, in adhering to 
the positions of humanistic naturalism, we can at least – as Francis Fukuyama does – 
appeal to “natural equality” (Fukuyama, 2003).
As we already noted, human nature provides the vast majority of people with a 
basic set of behaviour patterns, including the universal capacity for empathy. Since, 
by its very nature, what is transcendent is fundamentally unknowable, anyone may 
have their own ideas about it – or, for that matter, may choose not to acknowledge 
its existence in any way. As history clearly shows, all attempts to universalise the 
transcendent have led to aggression, wars, extremism, the destruction of trusting 
relationships, etc. When it comes to factors of estrangement, it is clear that religious 
disputes can only “add fuel to the fire”. However, we can say that mainstream religious 
worldviews predominating in contemporary society have either been supplanted by 
“immanent” humanism and have, as a consequence, become highly individualised 
(Taylor, 2007).
From here, it is possible to progress to a “posthumanistic” position, in which the 
emphasis is shifted from the person to agency per se and whose claims to universality 
repudiate all hierarchical forms of organisation. If all forms of being are fundamentally 
equal, then social unity is feasible precisely in such a denial of all totality. Thus, the 
idea of de-universalisation (deconstruction) can itself become universal and unifying. 
If there is no longer such a thing as a universal Truth, then there remains only the 
universal enjoyment of diversity and the freedom to play with various significations. 
Here we see something akin to the Christian idea of unconditional love. The 
postmodern philosopher Gianni Vattimo aptly notes that in the era of the collapse of 
metanarratives, the Christian doctrine of universal love experiences a second birth 
along with the decline of metaphysics as a systematic philosophy (or the possibility 
of such philosophies), capable of offering a coherent, unified, strictly justified picture 
of the unchanging structures of being, having itself exhausted the possibility of a 
philosophical refutation of the existence of God (see Vattimo, 2007, p. 22). 
This also means that it is possible to take another look at the idea of Christian 
love through a distinctive kind of “weakening of being”. Every life, writes Vattimo, is 
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nothing but a perfect enjoyment of the meanings and spiritual forms produced by the 
history of mankind and constituting the “kingdom of immortality” (see Vattimo, 2007, 
p. 65). Under the pretext of combatting humanistic myths and affirming true diversity, 
posthumanism actually leads to a blurring (as it were, “comparing”) of differences (as, 
for example, occurs in the desire to blur gender differences in the future cyborg society 
imagined by Donna Haraway (Haraway, 1985)). As the posthumanist philosopher 
Francesca Ferrando writes, “posthumanism challenges biocentrism, sentiocentrism, 
vitalism, and the concept of life itself, blurring the boundaries between the animate 
and the inanimate, in a quantum approach to the physics of existence” (Ferrando, 2019, 
p. 5). Within this approach, the human “dissolves” into matter, breaking up into atoms 
(“waves”, “assemblies”, “relativities”, “vibrations”) to reach a state in which everything 
is intertwined with everything else. Although this might sound attractive in theory, it is 
not at all clear how it can be put into practice. Here posthumanistic discourses can be 
seen to possess a certain critical energy, which nevertheless starts to flag whenever 
its creative potential is called into question. In this case, there is nothing with which 
to replace humanism, due to the tendency of posthumanism to establish a “negative” 
agenda (i.e. to deny some points of mastery and dominance), while little attention is paid 
to maintaining social unity. Posthumanistic discourses can thus be seen as focusing 
on distancing10 rather than on unity and transformation. Finally, many controversial 
contemporary social phenomena can be described in terms of a movement toward 
posthumanism: the erasing of cultural differences, the emergence of human-gadget, 
human-product and product-human blends, the hybridisation of person and machine, 
as well as the prospect of disposing of people considered “superfluous” to the 
contemporaneous economy into the virtual space (Fishman & Davydov, 2015). In 
the Manifesto of Metahumanism (metahumanism compromises a movement within 
which a philosophical synthesis of posthumanism and transhumanism is attempted), 
authored by Jaime Del Val and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, we find the following: 
It deepens the view of the body as field of relational forces in motion and of reality 
as immanent realised process of becoming which does not necessarily end 
up in defined forms or identities, but may unfold into endless amorphogenesis. 
Monsters are promising strategies for performing this development away from 
humanism (Del Val & Sorgner, 2011).
However, it is hard to understand how “monsters” resulting from unrestrained 
and chaotic self-transformations can even share common experience or emotions, let 
alone agree on socially significant problems having a global scope.
Thus, as we have discussed, the crisis of humanism is not in the first place an 
ideological crisis. Rather, it is a crisis of “immanent” anthropocentrism as a broad 
10 R. Braidotti: “We have to realise that, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist idea of a global revolution, 
the changes that we can achieve are collective, but step by step, by distancing ourselves. Look at how 
feminism has shown us how to distance ourselves from male violence. Or how anti-racism has shown us 
how to distance ourselves from white supremacism. The point is to distance ourselves. It is like an exercise 
in detoxification. We have to detoxify our bad habits, in our way of consuming, of thinking, and of relating with 
others” (Andrés, 2019).
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cultural phenomenon, serving to legitimise, in particular, the modern capitalist world-
system. The essence of this crisis lies in the destructive potential of the activities of the 
“immanent man”. Moreover, the main problem here is not so much that the modern order 
is capable of creating global problems that could potentially lead to the destruction of 
life on Earth, but rather that the “immanent man”, as a result of interventions in his body 
and consciousness, risks breaking the last strings that connect him with other people 
in common humanity. In the latter case, the mechanisms of empathy and collective 
reflexivity are destroyed, which is a direct path to an ultra-alienated society. In order 
to solve this problem to overcome such a crisis, a shift in ethical optics is necessary. 
Accordingly, the focus of our consideration should shift from the human as “being 
present” (Dasein) to personality forming an organic part of the social organism. Such 
optics can be provided by the philosophy of personalism.
A Personalistic Perspective?
We should start by noting that the term “personalism” has many possible meanings. 
We can take “personalism” to refer to that idealistic philosophy, which asserts that 
the real is the personal. Within the framework of this approach, it is assumed that 
personality is substantial, i.e., comprising the primary form of being. However, here 
personality is not only substantial, but forms the primary category, within which 
any explanation of reality may be proposed on the basis of personal “attributes”: 
consciousness, thinking, self-awareness, individuality, goal-setting, progress 
towards an established goal, modes of development, etc. Accordingly, it is asserted 
that God, comprising personality per se, is real. This understanding is most closely 
related to Christian tradition, being rooted in the doctrine of the Trinity. According to 
Niels Gregersen, the doctrine of the Trinity was truly revolutionary in relation to pre-
Christian thought due to the fact that the very existence of God began to be seen as 
consisting in acts of communication. Divine personalities (prosopa = hypostaseis) 
are defined as existing in relationships, in communication. Thus, the Father is the 
Father only in relation to the Son, the Son is the Son only in relation to the Father, the 
Spirit is the Spirit only in relation to the Father from whom it emanates. It is only in 
the mutual surrender and perichoresis of divine personalities that God exists as God 
(see Gregersen, 2013, p. 11).
Modern forms of personalism arose as a kind of reaction to the depersonalising 
elements in the rationalism of the Enlightenment, including pantheism, Hegelian 
absolute idealism, individualism, as well as political collectivism informed by 
materialistic, psychological and evolutionary determinism.
Although personalism is very closely associated with Christian theology, there 
are also aspects of personalism that not only go beyond the Christian philosophical 
picture of the world, but also beyond religion itself. Personalism affirms the supreme 
reality and value of personality, i.e. both divine superpersonality and a human person 
in dialogue with it (in the image and likeness of God). The personalistic approach 
emphasises the significance, uniqueness and integrity of personality, as well as its 
fundamentally relational (dialogic) or social dimension (Williams & Bengtsson, 2018).
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Since we cannot consider all possible personalistic philosophical currents here 
(not least on account of their diversity and abundance), instead we will try to state the 
position that seems most relevant to the context of philosophical discussions about 
technologies for changing the nature of man. The personalism to which we now turn 
is not represented by a specific philosophical school or movement. Rather, it consists 
in an attitude, a way of thinking that can be present in certain people, regardless of 
whether they consider themselves to be personalist philosophers or not. Moreover, 
it makes no difference whether a particular discourse is defined as “religious” or 
not. Here we will agree with Jean Lacroix, according to whom personalism is not 
a philosophy in the proper sense of the word. Or, seen another way, it is possible 
that not one, but several philosophical concepts of personalism exist, feeding on the 
same inspiration, but deriving from it various, largely dissimilar teachings: there are, 
for example, atheistic and Christian concepts of personalism, not to mention many 
others (see Lacroix, 2004, pp. 15–16). Accordingly, we refer here to personalism 
as consisting in a particular view of the world, in which the focus is on the being of 
personality as an organic part of the social whole (here we must separately emphasise 
the word “organic” – see below).
At this point, we will pause to make a necessary distinction, since the term 
“personality” has its own special meaning in the personalistic “tradition”. This 
does not refer to the same thing as each and every individual or individuality. In 
the context of personalism, personality exceeds the set of “social qualities” of an 
individual human being. The philosophers Nikolay Berdyaev (Berdyaev, 2010; 
2018), E. Mounier (Mounier, 1999), Jean Lacroix (Lacroix, 2004), and many others 
understood personality as an ecclesial being constituted as such by mode of 
existence and independence of being; this existence is supported through the 
adoption of a hierarchy of freely applicable and internally experienced values, 
through responsible inclusion in activity and a constant process of conversion; thus, 
it carries out its activities in freedom and, moreover, develops its vocation in all its 
originality through creative acts (see Mounier, 1999, p. 301).
In other words, a personality is a spiritual being involved in creative activity who 
actively asserts him- or herself through an intersubjective individuality. Here it is 
necessary to once again emphasise that personalism implies a fundamental distinction 
between the terms “personality” and “individual” or “individuality”. This difference 
could not be more perfectly expressed by Nikolay Berdyaev. According to him, the 
concept of personality should not be confused with the concept of the individual, as 
frequently occurred in the thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. Since the individual 
implies a naturalistic category, i.e. biological and sociological, the concept appertains 
to the natural world. If, from a biological point of view, an individual forms part of a genus, 
then from a sociological perspective it functions in terms of forming part of society. 
That is to say, it comprises an atom – indivisible, without internal life, anonymous. Thus, 
an individual cannot be said to have an existence independent of genus or society. In 
itself, the individual is an inherently generic and social being, only an element or part 
defined by its interrelationship with the whole. Personality, on the other hand, has a 
completely contrasting meaning, which derives from spiritual and religious categories. 
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Personality speaks of a person’s belonging not only to the natural and social order, 
but also to another dimension of being, to the spiritual world. Therefore, personality 
invokes a higher order of being than the natural and social. We will see that it cannot 
be part of anything whatsoever. 
Society tends to consider personality in terms of an individual subordinate, as 
something that it owns due to having created it. From a sociological point of view, 
personality indeed forms a part of society – and a very small part at that. Thus, if 
society comprises a big circle, personality represents a small circle inserted into it. On 
a sociological basis, personality lacks the ability to oppose itself to society and cannot 
fight for its own interests. However, from the point of view of existential philosophy, 
the opposite is true: society is a small part of personality, merely its social aspect; 
even the world is only a part of personality. It is not society nor nature that form an 
existential centre but personality, which cannot be reduced to object but is always an 
existential subject. Of course, personality realises itself through social and cosmic 
existence, but it can only do this due to a principle that is independent both of nature 
and of human society forming within it. Personality is not defined as a part in relation 
to any whole (by “part of the whole” here Berdyaev means precisely a mechanical, 
instrumental unit as part of the whole. In what follows, I will use the more appropriate 
term “organic part of the whole” – D.D.). Personality is itself a totality, integrating the 
universal in itself and refusing to be part of any generality, world or society, universal 
or even Divine Being. Since personality is not in any way natural, it does not belong to 
an objective natural hierarchy and cannot be inserted into any natural series. Rooted 
in the spiritual world, the existence of personality presupposes a dualism of spirit and 
nature, freedom and determinism, individual and general, the kingdom of God and 
the kingdom of Caesar. The existence of human personality in the world suggests 
that the world is not self-sufficient, that the transcendence of the world is inevitable, 
its completion being found not in itself, but in God, the supermundane being. The 
freedom of the human personality is freedom not only in society and in the state, but 
also from society and from the state, determined by the fact of forming an exception to 
the world, an exception to nature and society, an exception to the kingdom of Caesar 
(see Berdyaev, 1999).
Here, we should not be confused by the appeal to the term “existential”. In the 
sense that personalism is the philosophical attitude of a “sufferer” confronted with the 
abyss of its own subjective non-existence, the personalistic attitude is very close to 
the existentialist position. Nevertheless, the personalist philosophers tend to avoid all 
individualism. In experiencing its finiteness and mortality, as well as the emptiness of 
the modern “immanent order”, the personalistic “personality” experiences something 
like “existential suffering”. However, it is not by reflective “withdrawal into oneself” (as, 
for example, in Sartre), but by transcending or going beyond one’s own limits – i.e. by 
becoming an involved, social being – that it is possible to escape from this condition. 
Thus, we may also consider personalism as a distinctive philosophy of acquiring the 
sense of life by means of an “active” appeal to the eternal. Such an appeal is possible 
either by means of creative dialogue with the divine superpersonality, or through 
involved being in this world. A man struggles with his finiteness and mortality, with all 
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“dissolving” tendencies; in so doing, he is included in what can be designated as eternal. 
This “inclusion” or involvement occurs without loss of individuality, as a face portrays 
the uniqueness of countenance. On the other hand, it is exactly in creative activity that 
true individuality can be exercised, which receives its meaningful content in dialogical 
relationship with others. Personalism, therefore, invokes the space of intersubjectivity. 
At the same time, we understand intersubjectivity specifically in terms of sincere 
understanding of the other, i.e. compassion or “sympathy” for his or her experience. 
Here, personality is subjectivity (including inherent subjectivity), which transcends the 
biological matter of its medium, in the intersubjective space of culture.
It may be objected that, if considering personalism as a certain tendency or the 
aggregate of some characteristic premises of thinking, then the features of personalism 
can be found in many philosophical trends. Thus, a personalistic way of thinking 
(although often not in its entirety!) can be seen in Teilhard de Chardin’s concept of 
the noosphere (the noospheric planetary unity of mankind here functioning as an 
analogue of the personalistic “superpersonality”) (Teilhard de Chardin, 1955/2008), 
the personalistic spirit of Russian religious philosophy (from Vladimir Soloviev and 
Fedor Dostoevsky to Aleksei Losev [see Kolesnichenko, 2018]), the philosophy of 
cosmism of Nikolai Fedorov, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Vladimir Vernadsky and others, 
as well as the communist god-building project of Anatoly Lunacharsky (Lunacharsky, 
1925), and others.
Nevertheless, special attention should also be paid to Marxism, which in many 
of its variations is very close to the personalist worldview (for example, some works 
of Freudo-Marxist Erich Fromm are conceptually very similar to the works of the 
personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier (see, e.g., Fromm, 1955/1990, 2013). 
The proximity of personalism and Marxism has been repeatedly noted by the classic 
personalist writers themselves (see Lacroix, 2004, pp. 290–535). Such proximity 
should not be surprising, since in both philosophical traditions people are no longer 
considered as isolated beings, but rather as located between the immediate bodily, 
biological being and the social organism. There can be no such thing as an isolated 
“personality”, any more than personality can be located in the faceless, mechanical 
part of the collective whole. Karl Marx himself showed a particular sensitivity to this 
question, describing man as an “ensemble of social relations” (Marx, 1969). In his 
exploration of Marx’ philosophical and anthropological ideas, Pyotr N. Kondrashov 
cites the following features of the author’s personalistic understanding of man: a 
person is both originally built into the object-external world (nature, culture, society, 
the world of symbols, social consciousness) as well as being in a dialectical 
relationship with it, forming and revealing itself in the intersubjectivity of social 
relations, experiencing its being-in-the-world as a suffering person in the form of 
partial, existential relations-to-the-world and to-oneself (see Kondrashov, 2019, 
pp. 154–165). Therefore, for Marx, more important than all other questions was the 
achievement of a social condition that would eliminate alienation between people. 
The movement towards such a state could also be described as humanism (i.e. 
“genuine”, “real” humanism, etc.). However, from the point of view of semantics, it 
would be preferable to consider this in terms of personalism, since it is assumed 
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that there can be no autonomous, free, truly “personal” being as long as the social 
organism is loaded with contradictions. If, strictly speaking, there is no dialogue (but 
there is monological “imposition”, “violence”, “coercion”, “deception”, “repression”, 
“insincerity”, etc.); if there is an alienation of individual public “bodies” (or even “cells”) 
with respect to the organic whole, then the human “I” is not free (i.e. it does not seem 
to belong to itself), because it is (and is being formed!) in the discursive chaos of 
hostile forces. This point should be emphasised due to its relevance in the context 
of attempts to change human nature: “personality”, according to this approach, 
cannot have any kind of independent existence or be confined to an isolated natural 
container such as the individual human brain. Thus, personality consists in a set of 
relationships converging in a certain relatively autonomous whole. This statement 
recognises the posthumanistic approach discussed above. However, for Marx, 
along with many other personalist philosophers, a person cannot be liberated from 
the “fetters” that confuse and oppress him unless or until the social organism itself is 
freed from its internal contradictions as an intersubjective whole11.
In this sense, Marxism is essentially personalistic. However, here we by no 
means assert that Marxism is the same thing as personalism. Although we have 
seen that personalistic intuitions are present in many Marxist schools, we should also 
consider some elements of Marxism that would appear to be hostile to personalism. 
For example, personalistic philosophers have repeatedly criticised depersonalising 
interpretations of Marx’s philosophy, which reduce the being of personality to class 
categories in a kind of “tilt” towards collectivism (Berdyaev, 1999). It would also 
seem that historical relativism and anthropological praxis involving essentialist 
doctrines concerning humanity (see Kondrashov, 2019, pp. 91–153) are somewhat 
contrary to the personalistic way of thinking. In reducing the essence of humanity 
to a revolutionary change in the person and his/her environment, a consideration of 
subjectivity is constrained to the context of the present set of social relations, thus 
denying the essential personalistic idea of eternal dialogue. In this case, a public 
organism (the “totality” of social relations) is considered only in the context of a certain 
temporal discreteness, within which elements of the “new” are extrinsic (alien) to the 
elements of the “old”. In this regard, a real dialogue of personalities (and, therefore, 
a truly inalienable personal being) becomes impossible as a consequence of the 
denial of intersubjective continuity. Here we will draw attention once again to the 
11  Karl Marx: “Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us 
would have, in two ways, affirmed himself, and the other person. (1) In my production I would have objectified 
my individuality, its specific character, and, therefore, enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life 
during the activity, but also, when looking at the object, I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my 
personality to be objective, visible to the senses, and, hence, a power beyond all doubt. (2) In your enjoyment, 
or use, of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a 
human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created 
an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature. (3) I would have been for you the 
mediator between you and the species, and therefore would become recognised and felt by you yourself as 
a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know 
myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love. (4) In the individual expression of my life I would 
have directly created your expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly 
confirmed and realised my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature. Our products would be so 
many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.” (Marx, 1966, pp. 126–127).
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“existential” component of personalism: an inalienable personality can only find life 
to be meaningful through engagement in eternal or timeless dialogue. In this context, 
a personalist is any person who strives to ensure that his or her activity involves 
some kind of meaning, comprising a kind of being for the sake of descendants. 
Accordingly, if the intersubjective space of culture is subjected to rupture, then any 
meaning appertaining to the personal existence of living people is lost. For this 
reason, personalism implies a rather negative attitude towards the transhumanistic 
rhetoric of a “rupture” leading to the transition to a new, “postsingularity” level of 
consciousness (for example, Ray Kurzweil’s computron (Kurzweil, 2012)). According 
to personalist ethics, any creation of “monsters” with which it is impossible engage 
in sincere dialogue starts to look something like collective suicide. Even if the 
“monsters” themselves do not pose an immediate danger, this scenario would rupture 
the relatively fragile strands that bind humanity into a single intersubjective whole.
It should have already have become clear that personalistic optics implies an 
appeal to social holism – here it is emphasised once again that we refer to an “organic”, 
not a mechanical (!) whole. Relatively speaking, the crisis of humanism pertains to 
the humanistic society in which the individual and his or her “earthly being” forms 
the “centre” of the universe (and worldview). Conversely, a personalistic society (as 
a normative ideal) is first and foremost one comprised of those who strive to become 
part of a bigger picture, taken in the timeless (absorbed into eternity) dimension of the 
intersubjective space of culture (history, memory, etc.). This is neither consumerism 
nor hedonism, neither thrillseeker nor everyman, but rather encompasses those who 
go beyond the narrow framework of material existence, striving for an active creative 
statement in the world. However, such an ideal can only be constructive if the person is 
striving for mutual love and the unity of the intersubjective space itself. One of the most 
significant axiological shortcomings of both post- and transhumanism is their focus on 
the destruction of all intersubjective unity. Posthumanism, as we have seen, entails 
risks leading to value chaos, while transhumanism leads to chaotic technological 
transformations of the human species, which can lead to the complete disappearance 
of that which serves as the basis for possible commonality of experience, as well as 
affection and feelings. Post- and trans-humanism can thus be seen as two essentially 
different paths to the destruction of a common mental space, to total alienation and 
the destruction of commonality. Conversely, the ideal of personalism implies that the 
larger (wider, deeper, longer up to eternity) the intersubjective space, the stronger the 
unity of the person with the entire world (for example, through creativity aimed at the 
benefit of all of Humanity).
We will try to concretise the foregoing regarding its prospects for technological 
transformations of human nature.
1. First of all, it is worth noting that the personalist perspective – at least in 
the version that we are considering here – implies its own “ethical perspective”, in 
which the focus is placed not on the individual, but on the personality forming an 
organic part of the social whole (here, the social whole should be understood as the 
human social whole whose formation takes place on a planetary scale). Thus, it is 
meaningless to consider ethical problems associated with trying to change human 
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nature if the ethical problems of a changing society are ignored. This position finds 
agreement with Habermas’ position that irreversible interventions in the genes of 
unborn children should not be allowed, since this implies a “predetermination from the 
outside” (Habermas, 2003) involving a kind of “ontological lack of freedom”. However, 
no less unfree is the one whose “I” is formed in a monological (alienated) framework 
of social relations. It should be borne in mind that the biological “substrate” of innate 
physicality serves as a kind of “barrier” that protects against manipulative external 
interventions in subjectivity (for example, while advertising can encourage a person 
to buy sparkling water, it does not in itself generate thirst). However, the technological 
“erosion” of this biological “barrier” has the potential to make people more vulnerable 
to such “transforming” power. Here, it is irrelevant if the changes are reversible or not, 
or whether they are the subject of formal consent. In an alienated world, overcoming 
such “natural” boundaries is the path to absolutely asymmetric relationships (for 
example, when a person ceases to understand whether he or she really is the person 
as whom he or she identifies or whether he or she (or some other gender identification) 
has been completely “constructed” by someone else).
2. Accordingly, truly symmetrical, dialogical relations are possible only if the main 
social contradictions are “resolved”: socio-economic inequality on a global scale, 
the division of humanity into hostile nations, poverty and indigence, aggression and 
exploitation, etc. Only in such a case is it possible to predict the advent of personal 
freedom. This is also a kind of “posthumanistic” perspective, since the “authenticity” 
of a person’s personality is then considered in terms of the transparency of the 
communicative space. A personality does not belong to itself until it participates on 
an equal footing in a collective, (self-)identification as an equally-valued and equally-
participating member of a social organism (there is no paradox here since “immersion” 
in a social whole and dependency on it are inevitable: the only question is whether 
this “whole” is hostile or friendly, whether it is partly “mine” too). Therefore, the ethical 
priority in this case is expressed in the desire for at least an approximate achievement 
of a “disengaged” state, i.e. the struggle for a post-capitalist future (see, e.g., Davydov, 
2020), direct e-democracy (see, e.g., Fuller, 2015), world citizenship12, etc., and 
only then – balanced and gradual technological interventions in the human body. 
Such a perspective is certainly no more utopian than transhumanistic anticipations 
of technological singularity, universal cyborgisation, or, say, the construction of the 
above-mentioned computron.
3. The main danger associated with technologies for changing human nature 
is associated with the potential chaos of bodily and mental transformations, which 
can lead to the destruction of the universal human intersubjective space (lifeworld). 
The only obvious means by which this can be countered consists in collective 
reflexivity. At the same time, it is clear that simple democratic declarations or appeals 
to the existing mechanisms of nation states or international organisations will not be 
sufficient. What is needed is not more formal prohibitions or permits, but a genuine 
rapprochement of people on a global scale: a movement towards understanding and 
the possibility of sincerity. In this connection, the “noospheric” optics of Teilhard de 
12 World standardisation: https://www.mundialization.ca/about-hmc/history-of-mundialization/
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Chardin might seem to offer the best fit. A growth in global consciousness (collective 
self-awareness) becomes necessary due to a constant increase in complexity of 
the human social organism itself. Conversely, a lack of connectivity, “centring” and 
“nervous” (communicational) sensitivity or coordination of the social whole can lead 
to a systemic inability of mankind to prevent global catastrophes. In demonstrating to 
what extent the human organisation is “ungathered” or “mismatched” on a global scale, 
the COVID-19 pandemic recalls the postmodern “body without organs”: humanity is 
not able to recognise itself in its entirety (totality) or make timely, reflective decisions. 
Under such conditions, endless (and unprecedented!) interventions in the human 
body and consciousness are likely to lead to the destruction of what unites people into 
a single unified species (without “bodily” understanding, the possibility of achieving 
mutual understanding of the “social” becomes extremely doubtful). In addition, the 
technologies for changing human nature, as already noted above, are freighted with 
all kinds of inherent risks.
4. A personalistic perspective does not exclude the possibility of carrying out 
technological “improvements” to the human body. Rather, such improvements should 
be dialogical and transparent. In this context, we may simply remark that personalistic 
ethical optics is free of many of the essentialist features of anthropocentrism. 
A person is someone with whom I, also a person, can enter into sincere relationships, 
one whom I can try to understand and towards whom I can experience empathic 
feelings. Finally, a person is someone who is in the same dialogical and symmetrical 
relationship with the social whole in which I also participate. Therefore, a purely 
biological personality can be non-human in the “natural” sense. But if someone 
“drops out” or “withdraws into the shadows”, losing the ability to engage in dialogue, 
sincerity, love, then, for the public organism, such an element may turn out to be 
something like a cancerous tumour, representing a mortal danger. Accordingly, the 
personalistic approach suggests that all kinds of transformations of the human body 
should flow out of social dialogue itself, collectively and excluding any intersubjective 
asymmetry.
5. Finally, the desire for unity of the intersubjective space of culture, affirmed 
by personalism, implies a special, “existential” view. The state of personalistic unity 
and integrity (“collectedness”) is possible only within the framework of continuity. 
“Novelty” is to be celebrated not as something that breaks intersubjective space, but in 
its enrichment or transformation of this space. Otherwise, we are merely discussing 
the existence of what is alien. Such activities are, therefore, only meaningful to the 
extent that they are addressed to eternity. The person finds him- or herself not only in 
being present in the here and now, but also in the social whole, which goes beyond 
the boundaries of the present. Thus, personality does not exist here and now, but 
rather in the timeless dialogue of everyone with everyone else. Only in and through 
such a dialogue does personality acquire ontological status. Therefore, technological 
“improvements” to human beings can be directed not only to the future, but also to the 
past, i.e. towards an understanding of past experience including aesthetic enjoyment 
of what has already been. Maintaining the reflective unity of the social organism 
involves a consolidation of past and future.
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Conclusion
In the foregoing, I have tried to show that the historical phenomenon of humanism 
(as “imminent” anthropocentrism) is in deep crisis. Moreover, this crisis is not 
limited to strictly ideological considerations. In essence, it is a crisis of humanistic 
anthropocentrism itself, which provides the impulse towards mechanisms of 
technological changes in the biological nature of individuals. Such “improvements” 
in the conditions of existing alienated social relations are likely to lead to the 
destruction of the universal human “lifeworld”, a further increase in disunity and to 
general misunderstanding (up to the complete loss of the ability to empathise). In 
the long run, we are talking about the disintegration of a relatively unified humanity 
into many (at best, autonomous; at worst, mutually hostile) humanities. In this 
article, I have tried to show that many of the concepts of a post-anthropocentric 
future that are available today do not offer any reasonable solution to this problem. 
In response to this lacuna, a personalistic alternative is presented, which places 
personality – considered as an organic part of the global social whole – at the 
centre of the consideration. Here it is important to emphasise the risk that humanity 
may presently be approaching a situation where further centrifugal forces applied 
to an already atomised society (consisting of people considered as self-identical) 
threaten an “ideal storm” in terms of an outsurge of accumulated problems. Such 
a “storm” will quickly overwhelm a fragmented “posthumanity”, which is at best 
incapable of mutual understanding; at worst, comprising a society of monsters. As 
we have seen, only a humanity unified by a timeless dialogue between personalities 
can hope to emerge from such a maelstrom unscathed. Nevertheless, personalism 
does not exclude the possibility of changing human nature. On the other hand, would 
not it be necessary to first address much more important problems associated with 
alienation and disconnection, creating an atmosphere, in which any “improvement” 
is fraught with “superiority” and the destruction of the “lifeworld”? Therefore, in 
taking a personalistic approach, people should first understand each other and the 
world around them, multiply sincere and warm relationships many times, and only 
then seriously think about “improving” the human body and consciousness.
References
Alaimo, S. (2016). Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in 
Posthuman Times. Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press.
Andrés, I. (2019, April 02). Rosi Braidotti: “What is necessary is a radical 
transformation, following the bases of feminism, anti-racism and anti-fascism”. 
CCCBLAB. Retrieved from http://lab.cccb.org/en/rosi-braidotti-what-is-necessary-
is-a-radical-transformation-following-the-bases-of-feminism-anti-racism-and-
anti-fascism/ 
Bailey, R. (2005). Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the 
Biotech Revolution. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2020, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 220–247 243
Barad, K. (2003). Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of 
How Matter Comes to Matter. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(3), 
801–831. DOI: 10.1086/345321 
Berdyaev, N. A. (1999). Personalism and Marxism (Fr. Stephen Janos, Trans.). 
Retrieved from http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1935_400.html 
Berdyaev, N. A. (2010). O rabstve i svobode cheloveka [Slavery and Freedom]. 
Moscow: AST, Astrel’, Poligrafizdat.
Berdyaev, N. A. (2018). Smysl tvorchestva [The Meaning of the Creative Act]. 
Moscow: AST.
Boccaccio, G. (2003). The Decameron (G. H. McWilliam, Trans.). London, UK: 
Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1353)
Bostrom, N. (2016). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.
Bracciolini, G. F. P. (1984). Fatsetsii [Facetiae] (A. Dzhivelegov, Trans.). Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia Literatura. (Original work published 1470)
Braidotti, R. (2013). The Posthuman. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Braidotti, R. (2019). [Preface] The Posthuman as Exuberant Excess. In F. Ferrando, 
Philosophical Posthumanism (pp. xi–xvi). London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
Cano Abadía, M. (2018). New Materialisms: Re-Thinking Humanity within an 
Interdisciplinary Framework. InterCultural Philosophy, 1, 168–183. DOI: 10.11588/
icp.2018.1.48071
Chen-Morris, R., Yoran, H., & Zak, G. (2015). Renaissance Humanism and the 
Ambiguities of Modernity: Introduction. The European Legacy, 20(5), 427–434. DOI: 
10.1080/10848770.2015.1041819
Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.). (2008). Design and Destiny: Jewish and Christian 
Perspectives on Human Germline Modification. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Conde, A., & Javier, S. (2018). ¿Esposibleun Transhumanismo Marxista? [Is 
transhumanist Marxism possible]. Eikasía – Revista de Filosofía, 82, 47–86. Retrieved 
from https://eprints.ucm.es/48441/ 
Davydov, D. A. (2020). Lichnost’ i gosudarstvo v terniiakh postkapitalizma: na puti 
k novoi antagonisticheskoi obshchestvennoi formatsii [Personality and State in the 
Thorns of Post-Capitalism: toward a New Antagonistic Formation]. Moscow: LENAND.
Del Val, J., & Sorgner, S. L. (2011). A Metahumanist Manifesto. The Agonist, 4(2). 
New York, NY: Nietzsche Circle. Retrieved from https://metabody.eu/metahumanism/ 
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1977). Anti Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(R. Hurley, M. Seem, & H. Lane, Trans.). New York, NY: Penguin Books. (Originally 
published in French 1972)
244 Dmitriy A. Davydov
Derrida, J. (1977). Of Grammatology (corrected edition; G. C. Spivak, Trans.). 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. (Originally published in 
French 1967)
Des Périers, B. (1965). Cymbalum Mundi (B. L. Knapp, Trans.). New York, NY: 
Bookman Associates. (Original work published 1537)
le Dévédec, N. (2018). Unfit for the Future? The Depoliticization of Human 
Perfectibility, From the Enlightenment to Transhumanism. European Journal of Social 
Theory, 21(4), 488–507. DOI: 10.1177/1368431017750974 
Donaldson, S., & Cole-Turner, R. (Eds.). (2018). Christian Perspectives on 
Transhumanism and the Church. Chips in the Brain, Immortality, and the World of 
Tomorrow. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Esfandiary, F. M. (1989). Are You a Transhuman? Monitoring and Stimulating Your 
Personal Rate of Growth in a Rapidly Changing World. New York, NY: Warner Books.
Ettinger, R. C. W. (1972). Man into Superman: The Startling Potential of Human 
Evolution and How to be Part of It. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Ferrando, F. (2013). Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, 
Metahumanism and New Materialisms: Differents and Relations. Existenz, 8(2), 
26–32. Retrieved from https://existenz.us/volumes/Vol.8-2Ferrando.pdf 
Ferrando, F. (2019). Philosophical Posthumanism. London, UK: Bloomsbury 
Academic.
Fishman, L. G., & Davydov, D. A. (2015). Budushhee kapitalizma: ot litRPG k 
futurologii [The Future of Capitalism: from litRPG to Futurology]. Svobodnaja mysl’, 
3, 139–150.
Foucault, M. (1994). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences. New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Originally published in French 1966)
Freud, S. (1949). The Ego and the Id. London, UK: The Hogarth Press. (Original 
work published 1927)
Fromm, E. (1990). The Sane Society. New York, NY: Holt Paperbacks. (Original 
work published 1955)
Fromm, E. (2013). To Have or To Be? London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. 
(Original work published 1976).
Fukuyama, F. (2003). Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution. New York, NY: Picador.
Fuller, R. (2015). Beasts and Gods: How Democracy Changed Its Meaning and 
Lost Its Purpose. London, UK: Zed Books.
Gorfunkel, A. Kh. (2017). Filosofiia epokhi vozrozhdeniia [Renaissance 
Philosophy] (3rd ed.). Moscow: LENAND.
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2020, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 220–247 245
Gregersen, N. (2013). Imago Imaginis: Chelovecheskaja lichnost’ s bogoslovskoj 
tochki zrenija [Imago Imaginis: A Human Person From a Theological Point of View] 
(S. Pavlov, Trans.). In A. Bodrov & M. Tolstoluzhenko (Eds.), Bogoslovie lichnosti 
[Theology of the Person] (pp. 1–27). Moscow: BBI Publ.
Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 2. Lifeworld 
and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Th. A. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press.
Habermas, J. (2003). The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Harari, Y. N. (2017). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow Homo Deus. New 
York, NY: Harper. 
Haraway, D. (1985). Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the 1980s. Socialist Review, 80, 65–107. 
Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. 
New York, NY: Routledge.
Hassan, I. (1977). Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture? 
Georgia Review, 31, 830–850.
Hayles, N. K. (1999). How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Heidegger, M. (1978). Letter on Humanism. In D. F. Krell (Ed.), Heidegger: Basic 
Writings (F. A. Capuzzi & J. G. Gray, Trans.; pp. 193–242). London, UK: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1946)
Hottois, G. (2014). Transgumanizm – eto gumanizm? [Is Transhumanism a 
Humanism?]. Chelovek, 6, 46–53. 
Hughes, J. (2002). Democratic Transhumanism 2.0. Retrieved from http://www.
changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm 
Hughes, J. (2004). Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to 
the Redesigned Human of the Future. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Huxley, J. (1958). Religion without Revelation. New York, NY: Mentor.
Kolesnichenko, I. V. (2018). Lichnost’ v russkoi filosofii 1920–1930-kh godov: 
biografiia idei [Person in Russian Philosophy of the 1920–1930s: Biography of an 
Idea]. Moscow: Entsiklopedist-Maksimum.
Kondrashov, P. N. (2019). Filosofiia Karla Marksa. Ekzistentsial’no-
antropologicheskie aspekty [Karl Marx’s Philosophy: Existential and 
Anthropological Aspects]. Moscow: URSS.
Kurtz, P. (2007). What Is Secular Humanism? Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The Singularity is Near. New York, NY: Viking Books.
246 Dmitriy A. Davydov
Kurzweil, R. (2012). How to Create a Mind: The Secret of Human Thought 
Revealed. New York, NY: Viking Books.
Lacroix, J. (2004). Izbrannoe: Personalizm (I. I. Blauberg, I. S. Vdovina, & 
V. M. Volodin, Trans.) [Personalism: Selected Works]. Moscow: ROSSPEN.
Lunacharsky, A. V. (1925). Ot Spinozy do Marksa [From Spinoza to Marx]. 
Moscow: Novaia Moskva. Retrieved from http://lunacharsky.newgod.su/lib/ot-spinozy-
do-marksa/naucnyj-socializm/#%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BA%D1%81
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 
(G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota 
Press. (Originally published in French 1979)
Maher, D. F., & Mercer, C. (Eds.). (2009). Religion and the Implications of Radical 
Life Extension. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: 10.1057/9780230100725
Maher, D. F., & Mercer, C. (Eds.). (2014). Transhumanism and the Body. The World 
Religions Speak. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan US. DOI: 10.1057/9781137342768
Marguerite of Navarre (1984). The Heptaméron (P. A. Chilton, Trans.). London, 
UK: Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1558)
Marx, K. (1966). Zametki po povodu knigi Dzhemsa Millja [Notes on James 
Mill] (n.d., Trans.). Voprosy filosofii, 2, 113–127.
Marx, K. (1969). Theses on Feuerbach. In K. Marx & F. Engels (Eds.), Selected 
Works (W. Lough, Trans.; Vol. 1; pp. 13–15). Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/
archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm 
Mason, P. (2017). Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future. New York, NY: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux.
More, T. (2003). Utopia. London, UK: Penguin Classics. (Original work 
published 1516) 
Mounier, E. (1999). Manifest personalizma [The Personalist Manifesto] 
(I. S. Vdovina & V. M. Volodina, Trans.). Moscow: Respublika.
Nietzsche, F. (2017). Po tu storonu dobra i zla. Preliudiia k filosofii budushchego 
(N. N. Polilov, Trans.). [Beyond Good and Evil]. Moscow: Eksmo Press. Retrieved from 
http://nietzsche.ru/works/main-works/side/ (Originally published in German 1886)
Petrarch, F. (2011). Moja tajna, ili Kniga besed o prezrenii k miru [My Secret 
Book]. (M. Gershenzon, Trans.). Moscow: URSS. (Original work published 1343)
Rabelais, F. (2016). Gargantiua i Pantagriuel’ [The Life of Gargantua and of 
Pantagruel] (V. Piast, Trans.). Moscow: Azbuka Attikus. (Original work published 
1532–1564)
Sartre, J.-P. (1989). Existentialism Is a Humanism (Ph. Mairet, Trans.). In 
W. Kaufman (Ed.), Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre (pp. 345–368). New 
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2020, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 220–247 247
York, NY: Meridian Publishing. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/reference/
archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm (Original work published 1956)
Spufford, P. (1989). Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Srnicek N., & Williams, A. (2015). Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a 
World without Work. New York, NY: Verso.
Stam, S. M. (1984). Vedushchie idei ital’ianskogo gumanizma [Leading Ideas of 
Italian Humanism]. In S. M. Stam (Ed.), Ital’ianskii gumanizm epokhi Vozrozhdeniia. 
Sbornik tekstov. Chast’ 1. [Italian Renaissance Humanism. Collection of Texts. 
Part 1.] (N. V. Reviakina, N. I. Deviataikina, & L. M. Luk’ianova, Trans.). Saratov: 
Izdatel’stvo Saratovskogo universiteta.
Stirner, M. (2017). The Unique and Its Property (A. Ludd, Trans.). Underworld 
Amusements. Retrieved from https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/max-stirner-the-
unique-and-its-property (Originally published in German 1845)
Taylor, Ch. M. (2007). A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Teilhard de Chardin, P. (2008). The Phenomenon of Man (B. Wall, Trans.). New 
York, NY: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. (Originally published in French 1955)
Vattimo, G. (2007). Posle khristianstva [After Christianity]. (D. V. Novikov, Trans.). 
Moscow: Tri Kvadrata.
Wallerstein, I. (2004). World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
Weber, M. (2002). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: and Other 
Writing (P. Baehr & G. C. Wells, Trans.). London, UK: Penguin Classics. (Originally 
published in German 1905–1910)
Williams, T. D., & Bengtsson, J. O. (2018). Personalism. In Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism/ 
